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TELEVISION AND THE QUEST FOR GOLD:
THE UNOFFICIAL PAPER OF THE
1984 OLYMPICS
Victor P. Goldberg*
While sitting in front of the tube watching Olympic canoeing (or
Greco-Roman water polo, it's all a blur), I began to wonder about why
ABC had been granted exclusive rights to televise the Olympics. The
owners of the "Olympics" brand name could have sold the television
rights in numerous ways. Why did they choose to have a single network
provide all the coverage? Further, I mused, how did they get away with
it? If the NCAA's football package violates the antitrust laws, how does
the Olympic package remain within the law?' It struck me that a paper
speculating on the motives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Com-
mittee (LAOOC) might be in order.2 A second paper regarding the le-
gality of the contract is also probably in order, but I am not going to
write it.
It turns out to be a difficult question, and, confining myself to data
easily available to one ensconced in a comfortable arm chair, I am not
about to give the definitive answer. I had hoped, however, to shed
enough light on the question to have at least a modest influence on the
sale of television rights for the 1988 Olympics. Events have proceeded
faster than the publication process, however, and a year after this paper
was first written, the exclusive rights were awarded to NBC. Having
learned about the nature of publication lags, I now somewhat cautiously
commend these ruminations to the committee marketing the 1996
Olympic package. Or their children.
I begin with the presumption that the Olympian powers-that-be are
eagerly pursuing profits. While this proposition might have been consid-
ered shocking a few years ago, the extensive marketing of last year's pag-
eant should make the statement relatively uncontroversial. (Quick, what
was the official junk food of the 1984 Olympics?) 3 The question is why
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., Oberlin College (1963); M.A., Yale Uni-
versity (1964); Ph.D., Yale University (1970).
1 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104
S.Ct. 2948 (1984). I have strong doubts as to whether the NCAA agreement should have been held
a violation.
2 There are, I suspect, a number of partial owners of the Olympic brand name. To simplify
exposition I will assume hereinafter that the LAOOC is acting as the sole owner.
3 The Olympic sponsorship program had an extremely complex system of "participation
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the LAOOC can expect to make more money by restricting coverage of
the Games to a single network rather than unbundling and selling pack-
ages of events to a larger number of exhibitors.
The LAOOC has a monopoly, it can be argued, and monopolists
restrict their output. If they were to increase output by allowing more
events to be televised, the result would be a decrease in the price and,
eventually, a decrease in profits. While this seems plausible at first, fur-
ther reflection suggests some difficulties. What output is the LAOOC
selling? Basically, it is selling viewers to advertisers. The question then
becomes: under what circumstances would unbundling result in fewer
viewers or a lower net revenue per viewer?
If the events are shown on only one channel, people who want to see
other events might not watch at all; by decreasing viewer options, cover-
age by a single network results in a larger audience for that network but
in a smaller total audience for the Olympics. If the revenue from the
additional viewers would exceed the costs of attracting them, then the
LAOOC would be better off by unbundling. This proposition also de-
pends upon the effects of unbundling on the number of viewers and the
net revenue per viewer.
The subsequent discussion will be organized around two themes:
how might exclusivity increase the number of viewers and how might
exclusivity increase the net revenues per viewer. The explanations are not
presented in order of plausibility, as should become clear.
I. AUDIENCE SIZE
There are a number of possible reasons why unbundling might result
in a smaller number of viewers. One is paternalism: ABC will do a better
job than the viewer in choosing what is worth seeing. Left to his own
devices the average viewer would expect a lower average payoff from
watching any Olympic channel and would therefore be less likely to
watch the Olympics. On the "Scale of Credibility," I suspect this expla-
nation lies somewhere between the Easter Bunny and the Tooth Fairy;
with non-exclusivity, the individual networks would have an incentive to
provide more precise information on the timing of events.
ABC's exclusive coverage might have enabled it to engage in a form
of "bait and switch" tactics. It might have attracted viewers for minor
events by promising major events "shortly" or "in a while." If un-
bundling led to more precise scheduling of major events, then the "on-
hold" audience might shrink in size.
levels." Different levels permitted the sponsor to use diferent Olympic logos. Telephone interview
with Carla Michelotti, attorney for Leo Burnett, the advertising agency which handled the sponsor-
ship agreements for United Airlines, Allstate Insurance, McDonald's and others (Oct. 1, 1984). For
a general description of the scope of some advertising campaigns launched by sponsors of the Olym-
pics, see Olympic Advertiser" Let the Games Begin, ADVERTISING AGE, July 26, 1984, at 1.
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The Olympics carry a special mystique that might be destroyed by
too much coverage or by the competing networks belittling the events
with which they are competing. For example, it is amazing that if a
volleyball game carries the Olympic brand name it can sweep the prime-
time ratings, while if the same game is labelled as the Volleyball World
Championships, it would have a hard time beating out roller derby re-
runs. It is not, however, obvious that the mystique is more likely to be
destroyed by spreading coverage over more than one network.
Increased coverage might result in a reduced average quality (in the
technical sense) of the televised fare. The potential high ratings justify
large expenditures on cameras, special effects, blimps, and so forth.
Compare the technical coverage of the Super Bowl with a routine Sunday
afternoon game.4 If a network can count on only average ratings because
it is competing with two or three other Olympic events, then it might
determine that the costs of providing high technical quality are not worth
bearing. The lower quality would have a negative impact on audience
size and could, conceivably, result in a decrease in the total television
audience for the Games.
If televising the Games diverted revenue from the live gate, the
LAOOC might be concerned with the amount of television coverage
available. This was, undoubtedly, a legitimate concern of the NCAA.5 I
doubt, however, that this could be of much importance in the Olympian
context. It is hard to believe that people would incur the considerable
costs of attending the Olympics because they believed that their favorite
events would not be televised. Moreover, for the argument to hold, peo-
ple would have to believe that the probability that the event would be
televised under an exclusive contract would be considerably lower than
the probability that it would be televised without exclusivity.
Finally, it is possible that the form the unbundling takes could re-
duce the total audience. Suppose, for example, that one network could
show all the Games, but a second network could show only a one-hour
highlight show each evening. It seems rather plausible to me that the
number of viewer-hours would fall. It also seems more than plausible
that the Olympics could come up with far better (for its purposes) pack-
aging of the events. This simple example does show, however, that
there are some ways of breaking up the bundle that would clearly result
in a smaller audience.
4 Major events are often chosen for the unveiling of a technological innovation, like Super Slo-
Mo, which is then available for routine use on the network (and perhaps other networks depending
upon the proprietary nature of the innovation). The causality, however, is unclear. If ABC did not
have the Olympics, would it have been less likely to engage in the research that produced super Slo-
Mo? Would it have been less likely to adopt the technology? Maybe. But I do not think that a
rigorous argument could be developed to show that the availability of an exclusive Olympic package
inevitably results in a more rapid introduction of technological innovations by the networks and a
willingness on their part to pay a premium to the LAOOC in anticipation of that innovation.
5 See Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. at 2968-69.
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II. REVENUES PER VIEWER
Suppose that the average number of viewers in prime time would
increase if the Olympics were unbundled. It is still possible that the
LAOOC would receive less revenue by unbundling because the exhibi-
tors would suffer a decline in the net revenue per viewer. This could
happen if either their costs per viewer rise or their revenue per viewer
falls. First, let's look at revenue per viewer.
If advertising revenues were entirely determined by audience size
and if unbundling increased the total audience size in each time slot, then
exhibitor revenues would increase. For a number of reasons, however,
this might not be the case. Advertising revenue might, for example, be a
nonlinear function of audience size. That is, the price per minute might
be greater if one network has forty million viewers than if two networks
have twenty million viewers each. That should be a relatively easy prop-
osition to test, and if I ever get out of this armchair I just might do so.
If the rights to the Olympics are exclusive, the victorious network
might be willing to pay a premium for the large audience, using the expo-
sure from the Olympics to build up an audience for its fall schedule. In
such a situation, part of the payment to the LAOOC is for an investment
that is expected to pay off in larger advertising revenues for the exhibitors
on other shows later in the year.6 This proposition will be harder to test,
but it might be possible to determine whether a network's ratings rise
following the Olympics or other unique events (the Super Bowl or World
Series), and, if so, whether the carryover effect is significant.
ABC's package appeared, from casual observation, to include the
exclusive right to televise the Olympics as news. Other stations could
talk about the Games and show still pictures, but if you wanted to see
Mary Decker's fall that night you had to see it on an ABC affiliate. In
this sense, the bundle privatizes the news, converting it from a common
pool asset to a privately owned asset from which the LAOOC could reap
the rewards. Actually, this formulation is a bit misleading since the own-
ers of sporting events do own the rights to news clips. 7 Generally, how-
ever, it is in the interest of the owners to have the clips shown on news
shows, since this provides free advertising for their product. The Olym-
pics apparently do not need that advertising; rather it provides an audi-
ence-building service for the television stations which would pay a
positive price for the privilege of showing Olympic clips on the news.
This should show up in the form of higher ratings for the local news
6 As a related matter, good coverage of the Olympics might enhance the network's reputation
for sports coverage, resulting in higher ratings for its other sports shows.
7 See, e-g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938)
(owner of baseball team who maintains field and pays players has property rights in news value of
games played by the team). See also I. WARNRa, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS 940 (1953).
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shows of ABC's affiliates during the Olympics, with a possible carryover
effect afterwards.
It is plausible that the price of a one minute commercial during the
Olympics is greater than for another show with an equal rating. The
Olympic brand name might have additional value for the sponsor, either
because of the demographics of the audience or because of the value of
the implied endorsement. If one jock can help sell razor blades, think
what a whole herd of them can do. As the number of Olympic commer-
cials increases, the value of the endorsement falls. This is the sense in
which the increased quantity implies a movement down a demand curve
to a lower price. It would be relatively simple to determine whether the
Olympic premium exists. Assuming that it does, however, it is not obvi-
ous what impact this has on exclusivity. This effect refers only to the
number of commercials, not to how many networks show them. It
would be an odd coincidence if it turned out that the optimal number of
commercials always happened to be equal to the number that would be
carried by a single network regardless of how long the Games last. The
decision to extend the 1988 Winter Games in order that a third weekend
of coverage could be televised suggests that we have not reached the
point at which the fall in the premium would require a curtailment of
output.8
If Olympic coverage were available on a number of channels, view-
ers might be induced to change channels at the commercial breaks. This
would entail a lower exposure for each commercial and, therefore, a re-
duction in the price advertisers would be willing to pay per viewer. For
this argument to succeed it must be true that a viewer would find switch-
ing from a commercial during Olympic coverage more attractive if there
existed Olympic programs on the other channels rather than non-
Olympic fare. This is at least plausible because channel switching is
probably more attractive if the competing attractions are sporting
events.9 We might be able to gather indirect evidence on this from ob-
serving what happens when athletic events are broadcast opposite other
athletic events. For example, do advertisers pay less per rating point
when two NFL games are shown on a Sunday than when only one game
is shown?
A standard explanation for block booking, ever since George Stigler
presented his analysis of the Loews decision,10 is price discrimination.
The block presents the buyer with an all-or-nothing choice and in some
circumstances the owner of the goods can obtain a higher total amount
by preventing the buyer from picking and choosing. It is a nice argu-
8 Creamer, Sports Comeback of the Year: The Olympic Games, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 27,
1984, at 11.
9 See infra text accompanying note 18.
10 Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc: A Note on Block Booking, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 152.
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ment, even if it did not work in explaining Loews.1 I do not think it can
work in explaining the LAOOC's policy either. If the packages are put
out to bid rather than sold at a fixed price, there is no reason for anyone
to benefit by engaging in price discrimination.
A variant on this theme is more compelling. There are a large
number of programs available that could produce an audience with mod-
est ratings. Competition between owners of these programs will drive
down their price so that the economic rents would accrue to the exhibi-
tors. Programs that can deliver considerably larger audiences will cap-
ture a larger share of the rewards. Thus, an Olympic package that yields
very high ratings on a single network would enable the LAOOC to cap-
ture the rents from generating a large audience. If the Olympics were
shown on a number of networks with average ratings for each network,
the networks would be unwilling to pay amounts in excess of their next
best alternative-namely the price of run-of-the-mill programming.1 2
III. COSTS PER VMWER
It is plausible, though not inevitable, that the direct costs to the
LAOOC of administering multiple contracts would be higher than if they
had but one. This is sufficiently obvious that it is not worth pursuing
further. I will, therefore, concentrate on the costs of exhibitors and po-
tential exhibitors which can be passed on to the LAOOC, thereby reduc-
ing its net revenue.
It could be argued that economies of scale require that a single en-
tity be responsible for providing the video coverage of the Games. The
costs of specialized capital can be spread over a larger number of events.
Moreover, the special equipment and specialized labor can be used more
intensively.
By itself, this explanation does not work. ABC could increase the
intensity of its use of the special assets by renting them to other networks
covering the Games. Or a single entity could be given the exclusive right
to originate signals which could then be used by a large number of exhib-
itors. Indeed, the scale economy argument should cut the other way.
Other things equal, the steeper the decline in marginal production costs,
the greater the incentive to carry the Games on more than one channel.
Thus, unless there is some reason to believe that the cost curve conve-
niently bottoms out at a point which happens to coincide with the Games
being shown on only one network, the scale economies justification fails.
Pure technical economies are not, therefore, sufficient to determine
11 And it didn't. See Kenney & Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 261. L. & ECON. 497
(1983).
12 For evidence on the relationship between program prices and audience size, see R. NOLL, M.
PECK, AND J. MCGOWAN, ECONOMIC AsP.crs oF TELEVISION REGULATION (1973); Woodbury,
Besen, & Fournier, The Determinants of Network Television Program Pr'ces" Implicit Contracts;
Regulation, and Bargaining Power, 14 BELL J. EcoN. 351 (1983).
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whether the exhibitors' costs per viewer are increased by non-exclusivity.
The crucial factor is "institution-specific" costs. These sometimes appear
so much a natural part of the world that we fail even to notice them. For
example, suppose that production costs would be minimized if the
Games were shown simultaneously on three networks. One way of
achieving that is to give the highest bidder the right to show the Games
on three networks and have it rent the air time from the other two. The
LAOOC could even require that, as a condition for bidding on the pack-
age in the first place, the bidders agree to rent their air time at a preset
price or schedule of prices. Alternatively, the winning bidder could pro-
vide all the program origination for a fee to the other networks which
would then use the feed for their programming. We know, or at least
think we know, that these arrangements will not work. But why won't
they?
In both cases, the costs that arise specifically from the institutional
arrangement make these options appear unattractive (i.e., expensive)
even with the substantial economies of scale. In the former, the LAOOC
would have to expend resources to assure itself that there would be no
collusion by the bidders; determining the rental price of the air time
would present some problems as would monitoring the quality of the
network transmission. In the latter arrangement, even if the supplier is
not a competitor, there are real difficulties. For example, if the rental fee
is fixed, the supplier would have no incentive to maintain quality. If the
rental fee depends upon the ratings of the network, each network must be
concerned about the possibility that the supplier might shift viewers to
the other channels. If the fee depends upon the ratings of the Olympics,
then each network has an incentive to reduce its audience-building pro-
motional effort. The difficulties are not dispositive. Indeed, ABC did
provide the feed for most of the international Olympic coverage. 13 These
problems are exacerbated if the supplier is also a competitor. 14 I would
hate to be an NBC executive relying upon an ABC feed when the shows
are competing for the same audience.
It is conceivable that the economies of scale in production would be
so great as to offset the diseconomies that arise from attempting to coor-
dinate behavior across organizational boundaries. After all, competitors
do occasionally cooperate in the production of joint inputs. In the two
hypothetical cases, however, regardless of how strong the production
economies of scale might be, our instincts (mine anyway) are that the
13 ABC provided all the feed for international coverage. In fact, ABC was required to provide
feed for events which it did not itself intend to broadcast, such as coverage of events which were only
of interest to the foreign countries with athletes competing in the events. Telephone interview with
Jim Hattendorf, Assistant News Director of ABC News (Sept. 29, 1984).
14 Why don't these problems exist when one supplier provides the feed for the international
market? The international exhibitors are generally not competing with each other for the audience,
and, therefore, the costs arising from strategic behavior will be smaller.
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costs of coordinating in these particular ways would be too high.15
That does not mean that the costs necessarily will be too high for all
arrangements in which the origination and distribution of the signals are
not under the exclusive control of a single entity. Coordination problems
are endemic to networks; ABC and its affiliates face such coordination
problems all the time and they have managed to cope. The point is that
if we are going to argue that unbundling would result in higher average
costs, the source of the increased costs must be problems in contracting
across organizational boundaries, not economies of scale.
One possible cost arising from nonexclusivity is wasteful "overfish-
ing" for viewers.16 If three networks are competing for Olympic custom-
ers, they have an incentive to spend resources on building their audience
to the point at which the marginal benefits equal their marginal costs. 17
They do not, therefore, take into account the adverse effect their efforts
have on the cost curves of the competitors. The LAOOC is in a position
to "internalize the externality" by preventing excessive competition in
marketing its product. This is analogous to a firm allocating a territory
to a single salesman. To complete this argument it would be necessary to
show two things, neither of which I am prepared to do. First, if the
Olympics are shown exclusively on one network, there would still be an
incentive to engage in excessive selling to compete with the non-Olympic
fare shown by the competition. 18 The argument requires that the winner
spend less on selling than would have been spent had three independent
networks carried the Olympics. 19 Second, it would be necessary to show
that the extra costs are not outweighed by the benefits of saturation. For
example, there must be ten McDonald's franchises located within two
miles of my office. To some extent these cannibalize the sales of each
other. But, on balance, it is still, apparently, in the interest of McDon-
ald's to have such intensive coverage of the region, in part to take advan-
tage of expenditures that redound to the benefit of the entire group of
franchisees.
If the exhibitors' pre-contract costs are lower with exclusivity, then
15 I suspect that both forms of coordination would entail some antitrust problems. A winner-
take-all bid would be more likely to withstand antitrust scrutiny than would a system in which the
bidders agreed to rent their airwaves to the winner ('"asp," a conspiracy). That seems, at best, odd.
Nevertheless, even if the antitrust laws were unequivocally not binding, I would be surprised to see
either of these arrangements emerge.
16 The "overfishing" problem is developed more thoroughly in V. Goldberg, Fishing and Selling,
J. LEGAL STUD. (1986). The problem is further addressed in V. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem.
Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 736 (1984).
17 Note that some of these expenditures can take the form of increasing the technical quality of
the product-more cameras, higher-priced announcers, more instant replays, and the like.
18 This argument is analogous to the channel-switching argument. See supra text accompanying
note 9.
19 The total amount "wasted" with exclusivity might be greater than without it. That might be a
concern of the Department of Justice, but it is not one of the LAOOC.
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this is a possible source of exclusivity's attractiveness to the LAOOC. To
make this argument work, we will need some mechanism that will ensure
that at least part of the exhibitors' costs will be borne ultimately by the
LAOOC. While it is plausible that some of the costs do adhere to the
LAOOC, it is not a simple relationship. If, for example, there are five
bidders for an exclusive contract and each spends $X preparing its bid,
there is no reason to believe that $5X will come out of the LAOOC's pot.
But it is also true that if all five bidders were told in advance that they
would have to spend $2X apiece in preparing their bids, the LAOOC
should expect the winning bid to be lower.20 So the LAOOC will have to
pay some attention, at least, to the pre-contract costs of the potential
exhibitors.
There are a few reasons to believe that pre-contract costs would be
reduced by exclusivity. Assume, as seems reasonable, that potential bid-
ders know roughly how popular the Olympics as a whole will be, but are
much less certain about individual events. Will the surprise hit of this
Olympiad be women's gymnastics, boxing, men's volleyball, or soccer?
Will the basketball games be blowouts? Will the hockey team beat the
Russians? And so forth. If the Games are unbundled, the potential bid-
ders will have to spend a larger amount in market research determining
the probable payoff from the various packages. 2' Exclusivity reduces the
variance of outcomes, thereby reducing the rewards of seeking out this
special information. This is akin to DeBeers selling packets of diamonds
("sights") to diamond merchants.22 However, it would seem that most
of these benefits could be attained if the LAOOC designed the packages it
put up for bidding with an eye toward reducing the incentive to search
(that is, by putting together low-variance packages). It is hard to believe
that there would be any meaningful gain from this source by reducing the
number of exhibitors from two to one.
If the LAOOC attempted to sell, say, three packages, there would be
a complicated tradeoff involving how similar the three packages ought to
be. On the one hand, if the packages are not very similar, we have the
problem of high variance discussed in the previous paragraph. In addi-
tion to that, the bidders face a sequential bidding problem. The amount
they bid on package one might depend upon whom they expect will have
packages two and three, ad nauseum. On the other hand, if the packages
are virtually identical, all the bidders have an incentive to "free ride" on
the information produced by the winner of the first bid.23 Consequently,
20 There is a lot of fancy game theory that can be used to show that this statement is generally
correct, but not inevitably so. You don't want to know about it.
21 This "oversearching" argument is developed by Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organiza-
tion of Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON. 27 (1982); Kenney & Klein, supra note 11, at 502-05.
22 For a detailed analysis of DeBeers' selling methods, see Kenney & Klein, supra note 11, at
500-16.
23 This is the efficient market paradox. If the stock market is efficient-as the finance theorists
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they would spend too little on acquiring information. Disentangling this
whole mess is more than I care to do. The upshot is that there would be
some upward pressure on costs per viewer from this source.
Finally, it is possible that internal organizational problems of the
LAOOC might raise the costs of unbundling. Suppose that it is true that
unbundling would increase the size of the pie to be shared by the
LAOOC members. However, the form it takes might result in some
members receiving less. If it is too expensive to work out a set of side
payments to compensate the losers, they might block the unbundling.
For example, suppose that if soccer were shown separately, the total
LAOOC pie would be bigger. Suppose further that the share going to the
soccer federation would be based entirely on revenues from its own tele-
vision rights-it would receive nothing from the other Olympic package.
If this sharing rule resulted in the soccer federation receiving less than it
would have by remaining in the exclusive package, then it might oppose
unbundling.
In principle, the LAOOC should be able to resolve this problem and
achieve a mutually beneficial result. In practice, it is not always so easy.
Keeping the coalition members satisfied might require foregoing options
that would appear to be Pareto superior.24 This was undoubtedly a prob-
lem confronting the NCAA in determining which games to televise. Part
of the payoff to the schools with lesser football programs was televising
games of a larger number of schools than the networks would have cho-
sen. The broadcasters were precluded from showing the most profitable
slate of games, thereby shrinking the size of the pie going to the member
schools. Major league baseball did manage to find a way to avoid the
revenue loss that would have resulted from playing day games during the
week if the Cubs managed to make it into the 1984 World Series. (The
previous solution, Cubbie ineptitude, appears to have broken down.) The
owners have not yet managed to devise a solution for a more severe reve-
nue drain-pennant winners from small television markets. But give
them time. 25
have shown-then why would anyone waste resources trying to produce information? But if no one
produces information, then the stock market will not incorporate relevant information in the stock
prices. For an elaboration of this theory and a way to reconcile efficient market theory with the
production of useful information by market participants, see Kraakman & Gilson, The Mechanics of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
24 For a discussion of the problems in obtaining the benefits of unitizing oil fields, see Libecap &
Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Poo" Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM.
ECON. REv. 87 (1984); Wiggins & Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Pres-
ence ofImperfect Information, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 368 (1985).
25 Eventually the owners will learn that it is more efficient to sell the pennant to the highest
bidder than to engage in bidding wars for free agents, who are just a bunch of ungrateful middlemen
anyway.
1181
79:1172 (1984-1985)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As I said when we embarked on this journey, it would not be easy.
There are many plausible explanations for the LAOOC wanting to con-
fine Olympic coverage to a single exhibitor. On the other hand, there
appear to be a number of ways to break up the package which might not
be wonderful for the LAOOC, but which would not be disastrous either.
If I had my druthers, I would want to find a way to make un-
bundling be in the LAOOC's self-interest. Second best (for us, not them)
would be for the State to assert its ownership interest more directly. 26 It
is not clear to me why the Olympic brand name is a private asset while
the United States brand name (from which the Olympic brand name de-
rives a considerable part of its value) is in the public domain. If the
LAOOC were required to deal with the owners of the United States'
name, (that's us), one of the requirements for its use could be an un-
bundling of the Olympic television package.
It probably will not happen. Nevertheless, we can at least dream
about the possibility of having the 1992 Olympics available on two (or
more) channels. Now, if only we could find a way to have the 1988 polit-
ical conventions available on one channel (or less). ...
1182
26 Others might prefer an indirect attack, using the antitrust laws or television regulation.
